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Abstract.  The  question  of  what  Descartes  did  and  did  not 
doubt in the Meditations has received a significant amount of scholarly 
attention in recent years. The process of doubt in Meditation I gives one 
the  impression  of  a  rather  extreme  form  of  skepticism,  while  the 
responses Descartes offers in the Objections and Replies make it clear that 
there is in fact a whole background of presuppositions that are never 
doubted,  including  many  that  are  never  even  entertained  as  possible 
candidates of doubt. This paper resolves the question of this undoubted 
background of rationality by taking seriously Descartes’ claim that he is 
carrying  out  demonstrations  modeled  after  the  great  geometers.  The 
rational order of geometrical demonstration demands that we first clear 
away previous demonstrations not proven with the certainty necessary 
for  genuine  science.  This  is  accomplished  by  the  method  of  doubt, 
which is only applied to the results of possible demonstrations. What 
cannot be doubted are the very concepts and principles employed in 
carrying out geometrical demonstration, which enable it to take place. It 
would  be  senseless  to  ask  whether  we  can  doubt  the  essential 
components of the structure through which questioning, doubting, and 
demonstration are made possible. 
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Introduction 
  When Descartes proclaims the ego sum, ego existo in Meditation II, one gets the 
impression that this “Archimedean point” is an isolated truth, relying on nothing but 
its own self-certainty. Just several lines before, Descartes has summarized the results 
of the process of doubt from Meditation I: 
 
So  serious  are  the  doubts  into  which  I  have  been  thrown  as  a  result  of 
yesterday’s meditation that I can neither put them out of my mind nor see any 
way of resolving them. It feels as if I have fallen unexpectedly into a deep 
whirlpool  which  tumbles  me  around  so  that  I  can  neither  stand  on  the 
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bottom nor swim up to the top. [...] I will suppose then, that everything I see 
is spurious. I will believe that my memory tells me lies, and that none of the 
things that it reports ever happened. I have no senses. Body, shape, extension, 
movement and place are chimeras. So what remains true? Perhaps just the 
one fact that nothing is certain.1 
 
If the level of doubt has reached such a hyperbolic pitch, it does not seem like there 
could be much left to serve as a basis for the pronouncement of the cogito. Th is 
veneer of skepticism is undermined, however, by several remarks Descartes makes at 
the beginning of Meditation I and in response to his objectors. For one, recall that 
when the method is presented in Meditation I, Descartes says that it is  reason that will 
guide the process, and it is reason that convinces him that the form the method must 
take is the best one.2 Our question in the present study is: What is this background 
rationality and what role does it play in the  Meditations? To resolve this query we will 
need to take up the question of what is presupposed by the process of doubt. 
  We can begin to piece together the beginning of an answer from several texts. 
When the authors of the Sixth Objections put forward the challenge that “in order to 
be certain that you are thinking you must know what thought or thinking is, and what 
your existence is,” Descartes responds as follows: 
 
It is true that no one can be certain that he is thinking or that he exists unless 
he knows what thought is and what existence is. But this does not require 
reflective knowledge, or the kind of knowledge that is acquired by means of 
demonstrations; [...] It is quite sufficient that we should know it by that inner 
knowledge [cognitione illa interna] which always precedes reflective knowledge. 
This inner knowledge of one’s thought and existence is so innate in all men 
that, although we may pretend that we do not have it if we are overwhelmed 
by  preconceived  opinions  and  pay  more  attention  to  words  than  to  their 
meanings, we cannot in fact fail to have it.3 
 
Thus we know that the background rationality includes at least the “inner 
knowledge” of certain innate concepts. This is to be distinguished from “reflective 
knowledge,” which is known through demonstrations. But Descartes does not explain 
just what this notion amounts to. Is this the last vestige of deduction from the early 
Regulae? Does Descartes mean demonstrations analogous to those appended to the 
Second Replies? Or do demonstrations simply mean arguments, requiring premises 
and inferences (in contrast to immediate intuitions)? 
  Descartes clarifies this further in the Principles, article 10: 
 
And when I said that the proposition I am thinking, therefore I exist is the first 
and most certain of all to occur to anyone who philosophizes in an orderly 
way, I did not in saying that deny that one must first know what thought, 
existence and certainty are, and that it is impossible that that which thinks 
should not exist, and so forth. But because these are very simple notions, and  
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ones which on their own provide us with no knowledge of anything that 
exists, I did not think they needed to be listed.4 
 
The distinction appears similar to the one made in the Sixth Replies, yet this 
time it is made between “very simple notions” and those that provide us grounds for 
making existence claims. The simple notions in this case are surely the same innate 
concepts mentioned previously. But now we have a second potential candidate for 
being susceptible of doubt. If one’s belief has existential import, it can be called into 
question. 
  This criterion coheres with much of the process of doubt: all beliefs derived 
from the senses seem to make claims about external existence; so do the more general 
beliefs upon which they depend – that there is a world, corporeal objects in general, 
etc.; the cogito itself is also quite obviously an existence claim (and even though it 
turns out to be impossible to doubt, the meditator’s own existence was momentarily 
questioned). But other moments during the doubting process do not seem to cohere 
with the existence criterion: general concepts like quantity, size, shape and duration do 
not make any claims about existence. Neither do mathematical truths about triangles 
or arithmetic. Does this mean that these items of knowledge were never doubted? 
And further than that, perhaps they are not even susceptible of doubt at all? Or maybe 
Descartes’ criterion itself is faulty? 
  These difficulties led Marjorie Grene to investigate the question of “what 
Descartes did and did not doubt” in the Meditations.5 Her main interest is showing that 
Descartes never truly doubted the truths of mathematics and more importantly that he 
never  doubted  reason:  “Reason  itself  has  been  serenely  in  charge  all  along. 
Metaphysical doubt is just a pointer along the way, but even hyperbolical doubt, which 
is to be taken seriously, Descartes insists, in an intellectual undertaking, does not 
touch the secure domain of pure rational insight.”6 The latter includes at least causal 
principles  useful  for  proving  the  existence  of  God  and  simple  concepts  such  as 
thought, certainty and existence. 
  I don’t wish to enter into the debate about the status of the mathematical 
truths;7 rather, I want to take up the question of the undoubted beyond Grene’s brief 
initial  investigation.  In  attempting  to  understand  the  background  rationality  that 
enables Descartes’ method of doubt to take place, we will see that it becomes less 
important  to  discuss  what  Descartes  actually  did  and  did  not  doubt,  and  more 
important to investigate the difference between what gets brought forth as a potential 
item of doubt and what is not even mentioned. As we have just shown, the first step 
will be to resolve the difficulties associated with the respective distinctions between 
knowledge that is reflective, syllogistic, and with existential import on the one hand, 
and innate, intuitive, and with no existential import on the other. 
  There is yet another development in the Meditations that is significant for our 
inquiry. In the pages immediately preceding the first proof, Descartes makes frequent 
use of the natural light, of which he says, “there cannot be another faculty [...] as 
trustworthy.”8  It  is  remarkable  how  often  the  natural  light  is  invoked  throughout 
Meditation III (nine times), as opposed to the other five Meditations (only mentioned  
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three times). The natural light is introduced as a faculty distinct from our natural 
impulses  that  lead  us  to  believe  that  our  thinking  resembles  external  things  (and 
presumably other beliefs derived from the senses). It is used variously to know “that 
there must be at least as much <reality> in the efficient and total cause as in the effect 
of that cause,”9 that ideas are like images of things,10 that ideas and their causes must 
adhere to their own form of the principle  of reason,11 and many other aspects of the 
causal  principles  needed  to  prove  God’s  existence  “a  posteriori.”  Thus,  we  have 
another piece to the puzzle generated by Descartes’ announcement that reason will be 
our  guide  in  the  method  of  doubt;  for  in  Meditation  III,  he  says,  “Whatever  is 
revealed to me by the natural light [...] can in no way be doubtful [nullo modo dubia esse 
possunt].”12 But of course, this part of the answer requires clarification – this will be the 
second step towards the interpretive solution to our problem.13 
  We have uncovered several aspects to the problem of the undoubted. First, 
there are the potentially inconsistent texts where Descartes explains that certain 
notions are presupposed by the statement of the cogito, or are not susceptibl e of 
doubt, or did not need to be mentioned, etc. The constellation of issues surrounding 
these texts includes innate ideas, syllogistic knowledge, reflective knowledge, and 
intuition. These will be investigated in section I. The second aspect of the problematic 
involves the natural light; this will be taken up in section II. I contend that the key to 
making sense of this complex situation is to recall that Descartes adheres to a strict 
geometrical order in the Meditations, where “items which are put forward first must be 
known entirely without the aid of what comes later; and the remaining items must be 
arranged in such a way that their demonstration depends solely on what has gone 
before.”14 When the Meditations is seen in this light, it becomes senseless to ask why 
the elements of Cartesian demonstration – innate concepts and principles known by 
the light of nature – are never considered as candidates of doubt. 
 
Descartes’ Project as Geometrical Demonstration 
  The question of which concepts were available throughout the method of 
doubt was a recurring theme in the objections Descartes received to his Meditations.15 
Aside from a brief passage in Meditation III, 16 Descartes had done little to make his 
position on the matter clear in the original version he had d isseminated in order to 
receive critical comments. In response to the queries, he attempted to clarify his 
position most notably in the Objections and Replies and Principles, but also in a few other 
various places. The problem is that in the many texts Descartes makes a host of 
distinctions that if not wholly inconsistent, are at least substantively different. I will 
first go through the various distinctions Descartes makes; then I will take up a few 
interpretations  of  these  texts  given  in  the  literature;  finally,  I  will  offer  my  own 
perspective, showing how this goes some way toward resolving our initial question. 
  (1) Syllogistic knowledge vs. intuition. The first major discussion of the primary 
notions  presupposed  by  the  method  of  doubt  occurs  in  response  to  the  Second 
Objectors’ concerns with the so-called Cartesian circle: 
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Thirdly, when I said that we can know nothing for certain until we are aware 
that God exists, I expressly declared that I was speaking only of knowledge of 
those conclusions which can be recalled when we are no longer attending to 
the arguments by means of which we deduced them. Now awareness of first 
principles is not normally called ‘knowledge’ by dialecticians. And when we 
become aware that we are thinking things, this is a primary notion which is 
not derived by means of any syllogism. When someone says ‘I am thinking, 
therefore I am, or I exist’, he does not deduce existence from thought by 
means of a syllogism, but recognizes it as something self-evident by a simple 
intuition of the mind. This is clear from the fact that if he were deducing it by 
means of a syllogism, he would have to have had previous knowledge of the 
major premiss ‘Everything which thinks is, or exists’; yet in fact he learns it 
from experiencing in his own case that it is impossible that he should think 
without  existing.  It  is  in  the  nature  of  our  mind  to  construct  general 
propositions on the basis of our knowledge of particular ones.17 
 
The main distinction at work here is between knowledge arrived at by means 
of  syllogism  –  and  thus  with  certain  major  premises  in  hand  –  and  self-evident 
“primary notions,” which are known immediately through “simple intuition.” The 
only example of a primary notion we are afforded in this passage is the inferential 
form of the cogito given in both the Discourse and Principles.18 
  (2)  Reflective  knowledge  gained  by  demonstration  vs.  innate  knowledge. The  second 
major distinction Descartes makes is in response to questions by the Sixth Objectors 
about what must be known prior to the cogito: 
 
It is true that no one can be certain that he is thinking or that he exists unless 
he knows what thought is and what existence is. But this does not require 
reflective knowledge, or the kind of knowledge that is acquired by means of 
demonstrations; still less does it require knowledge of reflective knowledge, 
i.e. knowing that we know, and knowing that we know that we know, and so 
on ad infinitum. This kind of knowledge cannot possibly be obtained about 
anything. It is quite sufficient that we should know it by that inner knowledge 
[cognitione illa interna] which always precedes reflective knowledge. This inner 
knowledge  of  one’s  thought  and  existence  is  so  innate  in  all  men  that, 
although we may pretend that we do not have it if we are overwhelmed by 
preconceived  opinions  and  pay  more  attention  to  words  than  to  their 
meanings, we cannot in fact fail to have it. Thus when anyone notices that he 
is thinking and that it follows from this that he exists, even though he may 
never before have asked what thought is or what existence is, he cannot fail 
to have sufficient knowledge of them both to satisfy himself in this regard.19 
 
On the one hand, we have “reflective knowledge,” which is the result of 
demonstration. On the other hand, innate or internal knowledge is in us whether we 
acknowledge it or not. We may “pretend” not to have such knowledge, if we allow  
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preconceived opinions to blind us. The only concepts Descartes mentions here in this 
regard are thought and existence, as his response is tied to concerns with the cogito 
specifically.20 
  (3) Knowledge with existential import vs. knowledge without existential import. Whereas 
the first two criteria left much to be explained, Descartes is more clear in Principles I, 
10: 
 
And when I said that the proposition I am thinking, therefore I exist is the first 
and most certain of all to occur to anyone who philosophizes in an orderly 
way, I did not in saying that deny that one must first know what thought, 
existence and certainty are, and that it is impossible that that which thinks 
should not exist, and so forth. But because these are very simple notions, and 
ones which on their own provide us with no knowledge of anything that 
exists, I did not think they needed to be listed.21 
 
Here the contrast is between that which  makes an existence claim and the 
“very simple notions” that do not. Again we are given a list of concepts – thought, 
existence, certainty – that never get doubted, but this time Descartes adds the modal 
principle “that it is impossible that that which thinks should not exist.” He explains 
how principles like this fit in to the scheme in a letter to Clerselier of June or July, 
1646: 
 
It is one thing to look for a common notion so clear and so general that it can 
serve as a principle for proving the existence of all the beings, or entities, to 
be discovered later; and another thing to look for a being whose existence is 
known to us better than that of any other, so that it can serve as a principle for 
discovering them. 
In the first sense, it can be said that ‘It is impossible for the same thing both 
to be and not to be at the same time’ is a principle which can serve in general, 
not properly speaking to make known the existence of anything, but simply to 
confirm its truth once known, by the following reasoning: ‘It is impossible 
that that which is, is not; I know that such a thing is; so I know that it is 
impossible that it is not.’ This is of very little importance, and makes us no 
better informed.22 
 
Descartes makes it clear that he does not find principles lik e this ontological 
version of the law of contradiction to be helpful in discovering truth, even though 
they are obviously true. Both this principle and the previously mentioned modal one 
cannot “on their own” teach us about the existence of anything we did not already 
know of. 
  (4) Preconceived opinions vs. notions which involve no affirmation or denial. Descartes 
presents a fourth way: primary notions can be distinguished from those which are 
susceptible to doubt in his letter to Clerselier of January 12, 1646, appended to the 
Fifth Set of Objections and Replies:  
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[...]The term ‘preconceived opinion’ applies not to all the notions which are in 
our mind (which I admit it is impossible for us to get rid of) but only to all 
the  opinions  which  we  have  continued  to  accept  as  a  result  of  previous 
judgements that we have made. [...] For, after all, in order to get rid of every 
kind of preconceived opinion, all we need to do is resolve not to affirm or 
deny anything which we have previously affirmed or denied until we have 
examined it afresh.23 
 
This line of thinking continues in response to a further objection a few pages later: 
 
The second objection which your friends note is that in order to know that I 
am thinking I must know what thought is; and yet, they say, I d o not know 
this  at  all,  since  I  have  denied  everything.  But  I  have  denied  only 
preconceived opinions – not notions like these, which are known without any 
affirmation or denial.24 
 
This  portrayal  of  “preconceived  opinions”  as  judgments  that  we  have 
previously affirmed is reminiscent of the very first line of the Meditations: “Some years 
ago I was struck by the large number of falsehoods that I had accepted as true in my 
childhood [...].”25 By contrast, primary notions that have never been doubted are not 
known through affirmative or negative judgments that we have made. Rather, they are 
innate in us, as Descartes says in a letter to Mersenne of July 22, 1641: “I explained in 
my Reply to the First Objections how a triangle inscribed in a square can be taken as a 
single idea or several. Altogether, I think that all those which involve no affirmation or 
negation are innate in us.”26 
  I think (1) – (4) are the most important distinctions Descartes makes between 
primary notions that are not entertained in the method of doubt and those that are. 
However,  he  does  say  a  few  other  things.  He  frequently  contrasts  preconceived 
notions with those known by the natural light; but we will enter the full discussion of 
this issue in section II. He also distinguishes that for which a definition is appropriate 
and that for which a definition will only render the concepts at issue more obscure.27 
At some points Descartes says that no clear perceptions that we are immediately 
attending to can be doubted, while our memory of those same  perceptions can be 
called into doubt.28 The texts associated with the latter two distinctions will be helpful 
to clarify (1) – (4), but I don’t think they are of essential importance on their own. 
  One valuable and rather thorough interpretation of these texts is offered by 
Murray Miles in his book-length study of the cogito, Insight and Inference: Descartes’s 
Founding Principle and Modern Philosophy. Miles contends that the distinction between 
implicit and explicit knowledge is the key for making sense of the above passages. 
Much of his discussion relies on the Conversation with Burman, where Descartes tries to 
explain the possible inconsistency of the Second Replies and Principles I, 10: 
 
Before  this  conclusion  [conclusionem],  ‘I  am  thinking,  therefore I  exist’,  the 
major ‘whatever thinks, exists’ can be known; for it is in reality prior to my  
 
 
Society and Politics                                                              Vol. 6, No. 2 (12)/November 2012 
55 
 
conclusion [conclusione], and my conclusion [conclusio] depends upon it. That is 
why  the  author  says  in  the  Principles  that  the  major  premiss  comes  first, 
namely because implicitly it is always presupposed and prior. But it does not 
follow that I am always expressly and explicitly aware of its priority, or that I 
know it before my conclusion [conclusionem]. This is because I am attending 
only  to  what  I  experience  within  myself  –  for  example  ‘I  am  thinking, 
therefore I exist’. I do not pay attention in the same way to the general notion 
‘whatever thinks, exists’. As I have explained before, we do not separate out 
these general propositions from the particular instances; rather, it is in the 
particular instances that we think of them. This, then, is the sense in which 
the words cited here should be taken.29 
 
Miles  argues  that  this  passage  shows  that  “analytical  reflexion”  explicitly 
points us to the fact that we are aware of our own thought and existence in the cogito. 
The cogito does indeed rely upon principles such as “whatever thinks exists,” but we 
know these only implicitly until they are made explicit in further stages of reflexion 
after the cogito is understood. We can reason syllogistically only after this process of 
analytical reflexion has occurred.30 
  Miles also takes seriously Descartes’ claim that “It is in the nature of our mind 
to construct general propositions on the basis of our knowledge of particular ones.”31 
This is why the particular claim of the cogito is prior in the order of analysis to the 
general  principles,  even  though  the  former  depends  on  the  latter.  All  stages  of 
analytical reflexion make use of intuition, rather than discursive reasoning. The latter 
can help us clearly express what we have already discovered.32 
  I think Miles’ take on this complex situation is helpful and insightful. He 
sums up his analysis as follows: 
 
It appears from the foregoing that the task of reconciling the Second Replies 
and the Principles, while showing that the cogito, ergo sum cannot be part of a 
syllogism with a suppressed major premise, falls, not to the implicit-explicit 
distinction alone, but to three different distinctions, two of which (particular-
general,  intuitive-discursive)  figured  already  in  the  previous  replies  to 
challenges to the primitiveness of the cogito, ergo sum. Still, the implicit-explicit 
distinction deserves pride of place.33 
 
I agree that the implicit -explicit distinction appears to be important for 
solving the puzzle; but why make it the most important piece? Miles’ main evidence 
for the claim comes from the Conversation with Burman. Yet, recent commentators have 
called into question the legitimacy of relying too heavily on this work, as we are simply 
unsure  how  accurately  Burman  remembered  the  interview  when  he  relayed  it  to 
Clauberg, or how carefully Clauberg transcribed it; not to mention that many of the 
claims made there are not found anywhere else in the Cartesian corpus, or worse, are 
inconsistent with it.34  
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  This certainly does not mean that the implicit-explicit distinction plays no part 
in the story, as Descartes speaks this way on other, uncontested occasions (albeit less 
directly).35 But if Miles’ sole evidence for why it warrants “pride of place” comes in 
the Conversation with Burman, then we have reason to be suspicious.36 Worse still, Miles 
follows this assertion with one that has even less support: “By contrast with these 
three [particular-general, intuitive-discursive, implicit-explicit], the further distinction 
between ‘simple notions’ having no existential import and existential propositions like 
‘I exist,’ of which much appears to be made in the Principles, features in a relatively 
minor way.”37 It’s hard to see why the second-hand comments from a disputed text 
should take precedence over the statement of the authoritative Principles, inked from 
Descartes’ own quill.38 
  At this point, it will be helpful to go through the different items of knowledge 
that we know Descartes never entertained in the process of doubt. First, there are 
principles Descartes explicitly says he knows by the natural light: “that there must be 
at least as much <reality> in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of that 
cause,”39 “there is nothing in the effect which was not previously present in the cause, 
either in a similar or in a higher form,” “nothing comes from nothing,” and “all the 
reality or perfection which is present in an idea merely objectively must be present in 
its cause either formally or eminently.”40 These are all some form or variation of what 
Leibniz will later call the principle of sufficient reason; as for their being known by the 
natural  light,  we  will  postpone  that  discussion  until  the  next  section.  Descartes 
variously calls all of the above principles “common notions,” “primary notions” or 
“simple notions.” Descartes also admits that the principle “that it is impossible that 
that which thinks should not exist” is known before the cogito is pronounced.41 One 
would imagine that other similar principles are probably presupposed by the method 
of doubt, but Descartes does not mention them. There are also a class of concepts 
that  are  never  challenged  such  as  thought,42  existence,43  certainty,44  doubt,45  and 
truth.46 
  Will any of the distinctions (1)  –  (4)  above  capture  the  criterion  we  are 
looking for? Distinction (1), between syllogistic knowledge and intuition, does not 
quite do the job. It is true that none of the principles and concepts listed above can be 
understood through syllogism, but only through self-evident intuition. Yet, several of 
the  candidates  in  the  process  of  doubt  do  not  require  syllogistic  reasoning  to  be 
understood. The most obvious is the cogito, as Descartes makes clear in the Second 
Replies.47  It is also unlikely that simple arithmet ical calculations like 2 + 3 = 5 
necessitate the use of syllogism. Thus distinction (1) does not adequately express the 
criterion we are in search of. 
  Before moving on to the other potential criteria, a few remarks are in order. 
We said earlier that it wa s unlikely Descartes ever seriously doubted the truths of 
mathematics. And it is obvious that the cogito is impossible to doubt. Why, then, do 
these items rule out distinction (1)? Recall that the key to our discussion is what 
Descartes entertained in the process of doubt, not what he actually doubted. Doubt is even 
attempted with respect to the meditator’s own existence, even though it turns out to 
be illegitimate:  
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In that case am not I, at least, something? But I have just said that I have no 
senses and no body. This is the sticking point: what follows from this? Am I 
not so bound up with a body and with senses that I cannot exist without 
them? But I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the 
world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I too 
do not exist?48 
 
I have two reasons for thinking all of this is significant. For one, Descartes 
invokes the natural light in order to ascertain certain principles required for the proof 
of God’s existence. Why couldn’t the natural light be used to show the certainty of 
mathematics?  Secondly,  why  aren’t  the  principles  of  the  natural  light  mentioned 
during the passage about the possibility of a deceiving God in Meditation I? Wouldn’t 
they be considered on the same footing as simple mathematics? These questions lead 
me to believe that the criterion we are investigating is a significant one. 
  Back  to  our  question:  what  about  distinction  (2),  between  reflective  and 
innate knowledge? It is difficult to tell exactly what Descartes has in mind by the term 
“reflective knowledge.” For the most part, we can ignore his talk about knowledge of 
reflective knowledge, since this was merely a response to the Sixth Objectors’ claim 
that “you do not even know that you are saying or thinking anything, since this seems 
to require that you should know that you know what you are saying; and this in turn 
requires that you be aware of knowing that you know what you are saying, and so on 
ad infinitum.”49 None of this is at all essential to reflective knowledge, which is simply 
“the kind of knowledge that is acquired by means of demonstrations.”50 
  Descartes  normally  uses  the  word  “demonstration”  [demonstratio]  in 
mathematical contexts, or what he labels his proofs for the existence of God and the 
distinction between soul and body. We might call the latter metaphysical demonstration. 
Most scholastic textbook writers followed Aristotle in understanding demonstration as 
one form of syllogism, suitable for science.51 Descartes, on the other hand, talks about 
two different modes of demonstration: synthesis, which involves definitions, axioms, 
postulates and theorems, and analysis, which “shows the true way by means of which 
the thing in question was discovered methodically.”52 We need not get entangled in 
the many scholarly debates about analysis and synthesis here; for our purposes, it will 
be  sufficient  to  point  out  that  both  modes  are  set  out  in  geometrical  fashion, 
following a strict order, where “items which are put forward first must be known 
entirely  without  the  aid  of  what  comes  later;  and  the  remaining  items  must  be 
arranged in such a way that their demonstration depends solely on what has gone 
before.”53 
  The knowledge that is exhibited in the major metaphysical works like the 
Discourse, the Meditations, and the Principles Part I, would be considered reflective, since 
Descartes explicitly says they are the result of metaphysical demonstration, modeled 
after  geometrical  demonstration.  Likewise,  none  of  the  undoubted  principles  and 
concepts would be known via demonstration, since the demonstrations of the cogito, 
the  existence  of  God,  etc.  depend  on  them.  At  first  glance,  then,  distinction  (2) 
appears  to  be  a  good  candidate  for  doing  the  work  of  sorting  between  items  
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entertained in the doubting process and items not entertained. The only problematic 
item  might  be  the  cogito,  which  is  never  explicitly  considered  the  result  of  a 
demonstration.54  Even  though  the  cogito  does  not  look  like  an  argument  in 
Meditation II, it does depend on principles and concepts in the same  way that the 
proofs for the existence of God do in Meditation III. 55 In any event, even if we do 
consider the cogito reflective knowledge, distinction (2) alone does not clarify our 
puzzle. For we now must ask why certain items are susceptible to demonstra tion, 
while others are not. 
  To make matters worse, we have only considered things from one half of the 
distinction. The  other half  is  “inner  knowledge  [cognitione  illa  interna]  which  always 
precedes reflective knowledge,” and is “so innate in all men” that we simply cannot 
fail to have it.56 Clearly, the cogito is innate in us, as is our idea of God. The former is 
enough to doom distinction (2), but interestingly, it is our  idea of God, not the proof 
for his existence, that is innate. Although distinction (2) itself may not be the one we 
are  seeking,  we  now  see  that  Descartes’  conception  of  demonstration  will  play  a 
significant role. 
  The third distinction, between knowledge with and without existential import, 
seems to me to be the most robust of the four. Unfortunately, the increase in the 
substantive content of distinction (3) is matched by its failure to adequately express 
the criterion we are looking for. Case in point here is mathematics. Neither the truths 
of mathematics themselves nor their demonstrations make any claims to existence, 
even though they are one of the more startling inclusions in the process of doubt 
(while  nonetheless  never  being  truly  doubted).57  The natural light itself is always 
available and potentially could have been used to ascert ain mathematical truths, even 
before the criterion of clarity and distinctness was known. But alas, it was not. It 
appears, then, that distinction (3) is better understood as a possible criterion for what 
Descartes actually doubted. 
  Finally, let us consider distinction (4), which cleaves preconceived opinions 
from notions which involve no affirmation or denial. Descartes is primarily thinking 
of concepts such as thought and existence when he talks of notions that are not 
judgments. Just having a concept in   one’s  mind  does  not  necessitate  making  a 
judgment about it. Principles are a bit more tricky. When Descartes is classifying his 
thoughts in Meditation III, he says, “the chief and most common mistake which is to 
be found [with respect to judgments] consists in my judging that the ideas which are 
in me resemble, or conform to, things located outside me.”58 Although the main issue 
involves judgments about external things, Descartes does not say that propositions 
such as “that nothing comes from nothing,” “that there is as much reality in the cause 
as in the effect,” and so on are not judgments. These appear to involve affirmation, or 
at the very least are susceptible to affirmation or denial, even if we have never actually 
made a previous judgment about them. This brings to the forefront which side of the 
distinction  Descartes  privileges,  previous  judgments  that  we  have  made  in  fact,  or 
knowledge that involves affirmation or denial in principle. 
  Based on the principle of charity, I think we must opt for the former option, 
since Descartes explicitly mentions items of knowledge that involve affirmation or  
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denial, but are never entertained in the doubting process. So, distinction (4) becomes 
(4'): previous judgments we have made vs. innate knowledge that is not the result of 
previous judgments. This seems to work better than the previous possibilities; all the 
stages of doubt in Meditation I are beliefs that the meditator has previously accepted. 
None of the concepts or principles that we later find out have been presupposed all 
along are judgments that have been explicitly affirmed at any point. But if we do take 
distinction (4') seriously, we have to admit that Descartes’ reasons for entertaining 
doubt  with  respect  to  some  things  and  not  others  are  non-philosophical  and 
contingent.  It  is  not  inconceivable  that  at  some  point  the  meditator  could  have 
affirmed simple principles like “nothing comes from nothing” and “it is impossible to 
think  without  existing”  similar  to  the  way  basic  principles  of  mathematics  are 
accepted. I don’t think Descartes has in mind things that we just happened to have 
chanced  upon  and  affirmed  as  true  in  our  past.  So,  distinction  (4')  captures  the 
extensional aspect of the criterion; yet, it does not give us much help in understanding 
the essential reasons why some elements fall on one side of the fence and some on the 
other. 
  We have now pieced together enough of the parts to be able to attempt to 
resolve our query. First, let’s sum up what we have discovered about each side of the 
criterion. With respect to that which is entertained in the doubting process, we know 
that each item must be a preconceived opinion involving affirmation or denial and the 
kind of thing acquired by demonstration. On the side of that which is not entertained 
in doubt, the items of knowledge are innate, known through non-syllogistic intuition 
that precedes demonstration, and are without existential import. Thus far, most of the 
features listed are merely necessary conditions for their respective sides, since we saw 
some affirmative judgments that were ignored in the method of doubt and some 
innate,  non-syllogistic  intuitions  without  existential  import  that  were  not.  Only 
demonstration remains as a clear-cut deciding factor, and I do not think this is a 
coincidence; now we must clarify exactly what is demonstrable and what precedes 
demonstration. 
  Descartes wishes to employ the method of demonstration, following the great 
geometers.59  He explains what this means in the  Meditations  in  a  famous  letter  to 
Mersenne of December 24, 1640: “It should be noted that in all my writings I do not 
follow the order of topics, but the order of reasons.”60 Gueroult went so far as to call 
the order of reasons “the sine qua non of the value of Descartes’ doctrine in his own 
eyes.”61 The rational order of geometrical demonstration demands that we first clear 
away  previous  demonstrations  not  proven  with  the  certainty  necessary  for  true 
science. This is accomplished by the method of doubt, which is only applied to the 
results of possible demonstrations. What cannot be doubted are the very concepts and 
principles employed in carrying out geometrical demonstration that enable it to take 
place. It would be absurd to ask whether we can doubt the essential components of 
the  structure  through  which  questioning,  doubting,  and  demonstration  are  made 
possible. 
  We  have  just  shown  that  the  question  of  what  gets  entertained  in  the 
doubting process is answered by that which can be geometrically demonstrated. Basic  
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concepts  like  thought,  existence,  doubt,  and  certainty  are  the  very  terms  through 
which we can make sense of a system of demonstration. Principles such as the law of 
contradiction, or “it is impossible to think without existing” are the basis for making 
any rational connections whatsoever.62 The only remaining issue is how we can know 
which principles are presupposed by demonstration. The answer here is quite clearly 
the natural light, which Descartes invokes repeatedly in Meditation III.63 
 
The Natural Light 
  Having recourse to the natural light (lumen naturale, lumière naturelle) in order to 
affirm basic truths in Meditation III would have been less controversial to Descartes’ 
scholastic contemporaries than it is for the present day reader. Aquinas and Scotus 
primarily  contrast  the  natural  light  with  divine  revelation.64  In the preface to his 
Disputationes metaphysicae, Francisco Suárez writes: 
 
Divine and supernatural theology relies on the divine light and on principles 
revealed by God; yet since it is carried out through human discourse and 
reasoning,  it  is  also  assisted  by  truths  known  by  the  light  of  nature,  and 
employs such truths as ministers and, as it were, instruments in order to carry 
forward its theological inquiries and to shed light on divine truths. Among all 
the natural sciences, that which comes first of all, and has taken the name 
‘first philosophy,’ does special service to sacred and supernatural theology. 
For  it  comes  closest  of  all  to  the  knowledge  of  divine  things,  and  also 
explicates and confirms those natural principles that include universal things 
and in a certain way support and sustain all learning.65 
 
The division between pursuits of natural knowledge and theology is one 
Descartes  regularly  employs,  often  to  shirk  difficult  questions  about  the  faith. 
Furthermore, the  Meditations are primarily about “first philosophy,” rather than the 
topics  traditionally  associated  with  a  treatise  on  metaphysics  (being,  substance, 
accidents, etc.). Suárez later clarifies the role of the natural light, saying, “It is as it 
were an instrument joined to [a created] essence for the purposes of eliciting all the 
acts of understanding of which the essence itself, which is the basis of that light, is the 
proper and principal cause, acting through its own proper influence.”66 Eustachius a 
Sancto Paulo, whom Descartes admired,67 says, “By means of the natural light we can 
even in this life have imperfect awareness of God, not merely of his existence but 
even of his essence.”68 
  The  important  takeaway  from  our  brief  survey  of  scholastics  and  their 
medieval predecessors is that the natural light is primarily employed in contrast to 
supernatural illumination. Descartes makes use of natural light or reason in much the 
same  way.  In  his  prefatory  letter  to  the  Meditations,  dedicated  to  the  Faculty  of 
Theology at the Sorbonne, Descartes reveals the nature of his project: 
 
I have always thought that two topics – namely God and the soul – are prime 
examples of subjects where demonstrative proofs ought to be given with the  
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aid of philosophy rather than theology. For us who are believers, it is enough 
to accept on faith that the human soul does not die with the body, and that 
God exists; but in the case of unbelievers, it seems that there is no religion, 
and practically no moral virtue, that they can be persuaded to adopt until 
these two truths are proved to them by natural reason.69 
 
He makes similar remarks in the preface to the French version of the Principles70 and in 
many other places.71 
  Descartes also distinguishes the natural light from the “teachings of nature” 
or our “natural impulses.” He introduces the light of nature for the first time in the 
Meditations (after the synopsis) in this way: 
 
When I say ‘Nature taught me to think this’, all I mean is that a spontaneous 
impulse leads me to believe it, not that its truth has been revealed to me by 
some natural light. [...] But as for my natural impulses, I have often judged in 
the past that they were pushing me in the wrong direction when it was a 
question of choosing the good, and I do not see why I should place any 
greater confidence in them in other matters.72 
 
Descartes reinforces this distinction in Meditation VI: 
 
[...] I must more accurately define exactly what I mean when I say that I am 
taught  something by  nature.  In  this  context  I  am taking  nature  to  be 
something more limited than the totality of things bestowed on me by God. 
For this includes many things that belong to the mind alone – for example my 
perception that what is done cannot be undone, and all other things that are 
known by the natural light [...].73 
 
The  “teachings  of  nature”  are  our  inclinations  to  believe  that  our  sense 
perceptions represent external things. Even though this is a natural proclivity, and one 
that is God-given, it is so tied up with the uncertainty of the senses that we cannot 
trust it in the same way as the pure natural light of reason. 
  In his “Descartes’ Natural Light,” John Morris offers an analysis of the term. 
He contends that the understanding has two parts: active and passive. The natural 
light is the passive part of the understanding, which “is what makes me recognize that 
something is true, and there is no further faculty, superior to the natural light, which 
can show that it is false.”74 The active part of the understanding has the ability to 
conceive of ideas, while the passive natural light simply shows us what is true. This is 
an appealing interpretation; unfortunately, as Deborah Boyle argues convincingly, the 
textual evidence for Morris’ primary distinction is lacking.75 His main support is that 
the French version of the Meditations employs the phrases puissance de connaître (“power 
of cognition”) and puissance de concevoir (“power of conceiving”). But it is far from clear 
that these phrases are meant to indicate passivity or activity. And Descartes never 
clearly distinguishes between active and passive sides to the understanding.  
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  Morris does, however, confirm some of the features we had postulated of the 
natural  light  before:  it  is  a  faculty  of  the  understanding  that  recognizes  truths, 
particularly causal principles; these truths are completely immune from doubt; and 
following medieval and scholastic practice, the natural light is in contrast to divine 
revelation. He also points out another important feature of the light of nature that we 
have not specifically mentioned, however obvious it might be. The natural light is a 
function of the understanding, and is not directly associated with the imagination or 
the will.76 The most important thing to note is that the natural light is a faculty purely 
of the mind, unmixed with sensation or anything bodily. 
  With all of these pieces in place, we are now prepared to offer some insight 
on the natural light with respect to our larger interpretive goal. We know that 
Descartes never doubts – or even entertains the possibility of doubting – reason, since 
reason is our guide throughout the entire project. In the previous section, we also saw 
that Descartes is using the method of geometrical demonstration for metaphysical 
aims. The natural light furnishes us with the principles that enable demonstration to 
be carried out. Since Descartes is interested in proving metaphysical truths in the 
Meditations,  many  of  the  principles  that  are  brought  forth  are  causal  principles. 
Unfortunately,  Descartes  is  not  entirely  clear  how  we  know  which  principles  are 
known by the natural light, and in particular which ones are immune to the doubting 
process. 
  The ambiguity with respect to the natural light becomes apparent once one 
compares Descartes’ use of it in other places. In the Second Postulate in the Second 
Set of Replies, Descartes asks his readers to 
 
reflect  on  their  own  mind,  and  all  its  attributes.  They  will  find  that  they 
cannot be in doubt about these, even though they suppose that everything 
they have ever acquired from their senses is false.77 
 
He continues in the Third Postulate as follows: 
 
I ask them to ponder on those self -evident propositions that they will find 
within themselves, such as ‘The same thing cannot both be and not be at the 
same time’, and ‘Nothingness cannot be the efficient cause of anything’, and 
so on. In this way they will be exercising the vision which nature gave them, 
in the pure form which it attains when freed from the senses; for sensory 
appearances generally interfere with it and darken it to a very great extent.78 
 
The natural light is not specifically mentioned here, but the principles given as 
examples (a variation on the law of contradiction and a causal principle) and the 
language used (“the vision which nature gave them”) leave us in no doubt that it is the 
implicit reference. We see that Descartes does not think that the pure faculties of our 
mind  are  susceptible  to  doubt.  This  seems  to  go  well  beyond  what  was  known 
indubitably  by  the  natural  light  in  Meditation  III.  This  may  have  to  do  with  the  
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synthetic style adopted, which alters the order of demonstration (most notably the 
proofs for God’s existence). 
  Descartes also makes use of the natural light in Part I of the Principles before 
he has proven God’s existence (first accomplished in article 14). In article 11, he 
writes, “we should notice something very well known by the natural light: nothingness 
possesses no attributes or qualities.”79 And in article 13, titled “The sense in which 
knowledge of all other things depends on the knowledge of God,” Descartes uses 
language very similar to that from the postulates in Second Replies: 
 
The mind, then, knowing itself, but still in doubt about all other things, looks 
around in all directions in order to extend its knowledge further. First of all, it 
finds within itself ideas of many things; and so long as it merely contemplates 
these  ideas  and  does  not  affirm  or  deny  the  existence  outside  itself  of 
anything  resembling  them,  it  cannot  be  mistaken.  Next,  it  finds  certain 
common notions from which it constructs various proofs; and, for as long as 
it attends to them, it is completely convinced of their truth. For example, the 
mind has within itself ideas of numbers and shapes, and it also has such 
common notions as: If you add equals to equals the results will be equal; from these 
it is easy to demonstrate that the three angles of a triangle equal two right 
angles, and so on. And so the mind will be convinced of the truth of this and 
similar  conclusions,  so  long  as  it  attends  to  the  premisses  from  which  it 
deduced them.80 
 
This passage provides support for our interpretation in several respects. The 
class of ideas understood without reference to anything else seems to include the 
concepts discussed in the previous section  – thought, existence, and so on – even 
though it also includes sensory and mathematical ideas. The common notions “from 
which [the mind] constructs various proofs” are the principles we can know by the 
natural light. Descartes does not explicitly reference the natural light, but at this stage 
what else could furnish us with the common notions, since the doctrine of clear and 
distinct perception does not appear until article 30? So, we have the two components 
required for geometrical demonstration: concepts and principles. Finally, our earlier 
issue regarding why mathematics was included in the process of doubting can now be 
resolved. Mathematical truths must be demonstrated on the basis of mathematical 
ideas (such as triangles and numbers) and common notions (like adding equals to equals 
makes equal results). While we attend to such demonstrations we cannot be in doubt as 
to their truth; but the order demands that we prove God’s existence first, since we 
cannot give attention to these proofs at all times.81 
  We have gone beyond what Descartes has explicitly stated we know by means 
of the natural light. Perhaps it is what he meant by the term, or perhaps not. He gives 
us no precise criterion and so the concept remains a bit ambiguous. What has become 
less equivocal is our understanding of Descartes’ criterion for what gets to count as a 
candidate  of  doubt.  Metaphysical  proofs  using  the  method  of  geometrical 
demonstration are the desiderata. Neither our ability to demonstrate (reason) nor our  
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resources (concepts and principles) for constructing proofs are ever entertained in the 
doubting process. 
 
Final Remarks 
To conclude, recall the structure of Descartes’ tree of knowledge from the 
preface to the French edition of the Principles: metaphysical roots, physical trunk and 
branches bearing the fruits of medicine, mechanics and morals.82 Descartes does not 
believe that logic is part of the tree, but is something that must be practiced before 
one studies philosophy in order to properly prepare the mind. Unlike scholastic 
textbook authors, who usually spend a good deal of time discussing syl logism, 
Descartes does not include any material on logic. Instead, he refers the reader back to 
his “summary” of the rules of logic given in the Discourse. The four rules offered are 
rather underwhelming: (1) never accept anything as true unless it is presented clearly 
and distinctly; (2) divide problems into as many parts as possible; (3) follow an order 
from the simplest to the gradually more complex; (4) make sure one is complete in all 
investigations.83 Descartes does not believe these to be philosophica lly substantive, 
since they are not even included as part of the tree. Yet, we have shown that Descartes 
presupposes quite a bit more than these seemingly innocuous texts indicate prior to 
carrying out any philosophical demonstrations. 
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just on their own, and there is no better way of knowing and perceiving them. Perhaps some 
of the most serious errors in the sciences are those committed by those who try to define what 
should only be conceived, and who cannot distinguish between something which needs and 
merits a definition if it is to be known and something which is at best known just on its own. 
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have this sort of clarity and which are known just on their own. [...]Thus it would be pointless 
trying to define, for someone totally blind, what it is to be white: in order to know what that is, 
all that is needed is to have one’s eyes open and to see white. In the same way, in order to 
know what doubt and thought are, all one need do is to doubt or to think. That tells us all it is 
possible to know about  them, and explains more about  them than even the most  precise 
definitions” (AT X, 523–524; CSM II, 417–418). 
  And of course, this is stated most definitively in the Principles passage cited previously: 
“Matters which are very simple and self-evident are only rendered more obscure by logical definitions, and should 
not be counted as items of knowledge which it takes effort to acquire. I shall not here explain many of the 
other terms which I have already used or will use in what follows, because they seem to me to 
be  sufficiently  self-evident.  I  have  often  noticed  that  philosophers  make  the  mistake  of 
employing logical definitions in an attempt to explain what was already very simple and self-
evident; the result is that they only make matters more obscure” (AT VIII-1, 8; CSM I, 195–
196). It is interesting that Descartes insists upon this immediately after he has defined the term 
“thought” in the preceding article, even though he lists “thought” as one of the simple notions  
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